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ABSTRACT: This paper assesses Fodor’s well-known argument from multiple realizability to nonreduc-
tive physicalism. Recent work has brought out that the empirical case for cross-species multiple realizabi-
lity is weak at best and so we consider whether the argument can be rebooted using a “thin” notion of intra-
species multiple realizability, taking individual neural firing patterns to be the realizers of mental events. We 
agree that there are no prospects for reducing mental events to individual neural firing patterns. But there 
are more plausible candidates for the neural realizers of mental events out there, namely, global neural pro-
perties such as the average firing rates of neural populations, or the local field potential. The problem for 
Fodor’s argument is that those global neural properties point towards reductive versions of physicalism.
KEYWORDS: multiple realizability, Fodor, reductive physicalism, nonreductive physicalism.
RESUMEN: Este artículo evalúa el conocido argumento de Fodor a partir de la realización múltiple a favor del 
fisicalismo no reductivo. La investigación reciente ha revelado que la evidencia empírica para la realizabilidad 
múltiple entre especies es débil en el mejor de los casos, por lo que consideramos si el argumento puede reiniciarse 
utilizando una noción “delgada” de realizabilidad múltiple intra-especie, tomando los patrones de activación neu-
ronal individuales como los realizadores de sucesos mentales. Estamos de acuerdo en que no hay perspectivas de 
reducir los sucesos mentales a patrones de activación neuronal individuales. Pero hay más candidatos plausibles 
para los realizadores neuronales de los eventos mentales, a saber, propiedades neuronales globales como las tasas de 
disparo promedio de las poblaciones neuronales o el potencial de campo local. El problema para el argumento de 
Fodor es que esas propiedades neuronales globales apuntan hacia versiones reductivas del fisicalismo.
PALABRAS CLAVE: realizabilidad múltiple, Fodor, fisicalismo reductivo, fisicalismo no-reductivo.
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1.  Fodor’s Nonreductive Physicalism, Functionalism, and Multiple Realization
Among his many contributions to analytic philosophy of mind, Fodor pioneered the now 
widely held view known as non-reductive physicalism (Block & Fodor, 1972; Fodor, 1974, 
1975). Fodor’s concern in these initial papers was to maintain what he took to be the cen-
tral tenet of physicalism, the ‘generality’ of physics, while retaining the autonomy of the 
special sciences (and of psychology in particular).
The ‘generality of physics’, according to Fodor, is “…roughly, the view that all events 
which fall under the laws of any science are physical events and hence fall under the laws of 
physics” (Fodor 1974, p. 97). With regard to psychology, a commitment to the generality 
of physics amounts to a commitment to a token-identity between psychological events and 
physical events (so that every event that falls under the laws of psychology is identical to 
a physical event that falls under some law of physics). Fodor argued that accepting token-
physicalism does not entail type-physicalism; it does not entail that psychological kinds (or 
properties) are reducible to physical kinds (or properties). And, conversely, denying the re-
ducibility of psychology—affirming its autonomy from physics—does not require aban-
doning physicalism.
The compatibility of these two claims—generality of physics and autonomy of psychol-
ogy—is claimed to hold because mental kinds are functional kinds. That is, mental kinds 
(along with other, perhaps all, special science kinds) are individuated not by features of 
their material composition or structure, but by their functional-causal profile, where this 
is specified by the causal lawlike generalizations (of psychology) holding over the mental 
predicates that correspond to those kinds.1 As functional kinds, psychological kinds can 
(metaphysically and nomologically) be realized by many different kinds of physical states. 
Very different types of systems, from organic brains to silicon chips might, when properly 
‘hooked up’, have the same functional-causal profile that individuates a single mental kind.2
Furthermore, Fodor concludes that, as a matter of empirical fact, psychological kinds 
most probably are multiply realized. Drawing upon Putnam’s (1967) ‘Psychological Predi-
cates’, Block and Fodor argue that “[t]he argument against physicalism rests upon the em-
pirical likelihood that creatures of different composition and structure, which are in no 
interesting sense in identical physical states, can nevertheless be in identical psychologi-
cal states; hence that types of psychological states are not in correspondence with types of 
physical states.”(Block and Fodor, 1972, p. 160) That is, recognizing that the same psycho-
logical generalizations are likely to hold of creatures vastly different in their physical com-
position—human beings, cats, and Martians—and perhaps indefinitely many such systems 
(if we consider functionally similar computational systems)—blocks any possible identifi-
cation of the mental kinds appearing in such generalizations with corresponding physical 
1 “[T]he basic condition upon type identity in science” Block and Fodor tell us “is that it makes possi-
ble the articulation of the domain of laws.” And, “then it looks as though substantive conditions upon 
type identity of psychological states will be imposed by reference to the psychological (and perhaps 
neurological) laws which operate upon those states and in no other way.” (1972, p. 179-180)
2 As Block and Fodor say: “in all probability, distinct neurological states can be functionally identi-
cal. That is, satisfaction of the criteria for type-distinctness of neurological states probably does not 
guarantee satisfaction of the criteria for type-distinctness of psychological states or vice versa.” (1972, 
p. 180)
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kinds. This is the multiple realizability argument against the reducibility of mental to phys-
ical kinds.
Given the centrality of this argument to Fodor’s position (and other non-reductive 
physicalists), it has received a great deal of attention throughout the years.3 In sections 2 
and 3 we address one recent and especially interesting objection to the multiple realizabil-
ity of mental kinds, as advanced by Polger and Shapiro (2016). We argue that though their 
objections are effective against Fodor’s original appeal to (inter-species) multiple realizabil-
ity (section 2), he may be able to fortify his argument for non-reductive physicalism against 
such objections by appeal to the empirical plausibility of a more limited (intra-species) va-
riety (section 3), based on the popular supposition that events of a single mental kind are 
realized by diverse neural firing patterns. However, in section 4 we argue that neural firing 
patterns are not the best candidates to serve as realizers of mental events. Instead, the most 
plausible realizers of mental events are higher-level, global, neural properties. As we bring 
out, this view of how mental events are realized speaks against Fodor’s non-reductive physi-
calism and in favor of a reductive version of physicalism.
2. Polger and Shapiro on Multiple Realizability
Larry Shapiro and Tom Polger have mounted a powerful attack on the argument from 
multiple realizability, directed specifically against Fodor’s arguments for non-reductive 
physicalism (e.g., Shapiro, 2000, 2008, 2010; Polger, 2002, 2004, 2009; Shapiro and Polger, 
2012) culminating in their co-authored, and appropriately titled, The Multiple Realization 
Book (Polger and Shapiro, 2016).
Polger and Shapiro begin with the observation that traditional proponents of non-re-
ductive physicalism, Fodor among them, sometimes operate with a notion of multiple real-
izability that illicitly considers any variation in would-be realizers as proof that the kind in 
question is multiply realizable. They agree that the world is full of variation, and that, as a 
result, we can expect to find a great deal of variability among different instances of the same 
natural kind. Yet, to establish that some natural kind is multiply realizable, variation in its 
instances, its would-be realizers, must be of the right sort. And, significantly, whether with 
respect to any particular natural kind the variation in its would-be realizers is of the right 
sort is an empirical question that cannot be resolved a priori.
To illustrate their main point, their favored example is the corkscrew.4 Corkscrews, they 
note, come in a great variety of different shapes, sizes, and colors, and are made of various 
different materials, from plastics, to wood, steel and titanium, all of which satisfy the func-
tion ‘corked-bottle in → uncorked-bottle out’. Nonetheless, they argue, it would be a mis-
take merely on those grounds to suppose that the kind ‘corkscrew’ is multiply realizable. Vari-
ation in color and material composition among different corkscrews is irrelevant to whether 
the kind ‘corkscrew’ is multiply realized, as such features are irrelevant to their satisfying the 
3 There is a vast literature on the multiple realizability argument. See Bickle (2019) for a review and 
comprehensive bibliography. 
4 As they note, being a corkscrew isn’t a pure functional kind, as being a member of this kind presuma-
bly requires satisfying certain material and structural constraints—at the very least involving a screw of 
sufficient rigidity.
José Luis Bermúdez, Arnon Cahen
62 Theoria, 2020, 35/1, 59-74
corkscrew-function. Nonetheless, they argue that the functional kind ‘corkscrew’ is multiply 
realizable by different kinds of mechanisms—there are single-lever, ‘waiter’, corkscrews, there 
are double-lever corkscrews, and likely many other screw-involving mechanisms that when 
in appropriate contact with a corked bottle produce an uncorked bottle in its stead. What 
makes these not merely different instances of the corkscrew kind, but different realizers of 
the same functional kind is that each requires a different mechanical explanation of how the 
function that individuates the kind ‘corkscrew’ is brought about.5
More generally, Polger and Shapiro propose their ‘Official Recipe’ for multiple realiza-
tion (2016, p. 67). For two entities, A and B, to be different realizers (rather than mere in-
stances) of the same realized kind, and, hence, for the latter to count as multiply realized, 
the following criteria must be satisfied:
1. As and Bs are of the same kind in model or taxonomic system S1 (the realized 
kind).
2. As and Bs are of different kinds in model or taxonomic system S2 (the realizing 
kinds).
3. The factors that lead the As and Bs to be differently classified by S2 must be 
among those that lead them to be commonly classified by S1.
4. The relevant S2-variation between As and Bs must be distinct from the S1 intra-
kind variation between As and Bs, rather than simply mapping onto the S1 kind 
variation.
Conditions (3) and (4) are the most crucial elements here. Condition (3) captures the re-
quirement that the differences between As and Bs must be relevant to their both being clas-
sified as the same realized kind, while condition (4) requires that the differences between 
As and Bs do not merely map onto individual differences within the same functional kind, 
but that they contribute to their sameness with respect to the functional kind; so that As 
and Bs are, as they put it, ‘differently the same’. Thus, while it is clear that the length of 
the lever in a single-lever corkscrew is relevant to its carrying out its corkscrew function—
so that different corkscrews that differ in the length of their lever would satisfy condition 
(3)—nonetheless, variations in the length of the lever also bring about differences in the 
corkscrew’s functional description—for example, how well or easily the corkscrew function 
is carried out. As a result, the two corkscrews would not satisfy condition (4), because they 
would be differently different (even though these differences are within the same broad 
functional kind), not differently the same.
They sum up their position:
“We have argued that multiple realization is not just variation, it is a distinctive kind of vari-
ation. This is why the mere fact that the world is Heraclitean—that all is flux—does not by itself 
5 As Polger and Shapiro put it: “Because these two devices make use of different mechanical princi-
ples—one levers, one rack and pinions, and so forth—we conclude that they do the corkscrew job in 
different ways ... In contrast, if we consider two waiter’s corkscrews that differ in the material of which 
they are made … or in their color …, the imagined science of mechanical artifacts tells us that these dif-
ferences are not relevant differences (Shapiro, 2000). The reason is that the same explanation of how 
the device does its corkscrew job applies to all of them, regardless of material composition and color.” 
(Polger and Shapiro, 2016, p. 65)
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show that mental states are multiply realized. Multiple realization requires a special pattern of 
variation: Relevantly the same function performed in relevantly different ways, where the differ-
ences contribute to the sameness in function and not just to the differences in function.” (Polger 
and Shapiro 2016, p. 77)
With this in mind, they argue that we have little reason to think that specifically mental 
kinds are multiply realizable. Consider Fodor’s argument for the multiple realizability of 
mental kinds. Fodor claims that a great variety of species, both actual (human beings, cats, 
etc.) and imagined (e.g., Martians), can realize the same functional mental kinds. However, 
as Polger and Shapiro argue, whether some kind or other is multiply realizable depends on 
whether we have plausible empirical reasons to think that the variations in would-be realiz-
ers are of the right kind. It depends on whether ‘relevantly the same function is performed 
in relevantly different ways.’
And, in fact, as many have argued (Polger and Shapiro, most recently, but see also 
Couch, 2004), the assumption that psychological generalizations cut across different spe-
cies lacks empirical grounding. Different species are not merely different with respect to 
their physical composition and structure; they are also functionally different. And, if so, 
we have good reasons to think that it is not the case that across different species ‘relevantly 
the same functions are performed in relevantly different ways’; thus, violating condition (1) 
above. Furthermore, to the extent that similar functions are performed by different physi-
cal systems, it is likely that the differences among these physical systems merely account for 
the differences in function, rather than their similarity. In this way, these differences would 
not count as different realizers of the same function, as they would violate point (4) of 
Polger and Shapiro’s criteria for multiple realizations above.
As one example, discussed by Couch (2004) and later by Polger and Shapiro (2016), 
consider the case of the camera eye, different instances of which occur in human beings 
and octopuses (among other species, of course). On the face of it, the camera eye appears 
to be multiply realized by two physically different systems that have evolved independently 
but are the product of convergent evolutionary forces (where the same traits are ‘selected 
for’ by different evolutionary pressures).6 As Couch notes, though both eyes involve a sin-
gle lens and a retina, they differ in the kinds of pigments in their photoreceptors. Further-
more, “The retina in the human eye contains an array of rods and cones, and light is fo-
cused onto the receptors by bending the lens to change its shape. The retina in the octopus 
eye contains rhabdomeres, and focusing light involves moving the lens backwards and for-
wards within the shell. The parts of the structures are different and operate in different 
ways.”(Couch, 2004, p. 202) Importantly, these differences in the implementing physical 
mechanisms count against the claim that the camera eye is multiply realized, because they 
bring with them stark functional differences. For example, having a single pigment means 
that octopuses are color blind, and they respond to different kinds of stimuli with different 
reaction times, etc.
The example of camera eyes in different species is not a direct example of a mental 
kind, but given that the eye is a critical component of the physical realizer of a creature’s 
perceptual states, it is certainly relevant to the question of whether the same kinds of per-
6 Evolutionary convergence was one of Block and Fodor’s (1972) central empirical considerations in fa-
vor of the multiple realizability of mental kinds. 
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ceptual states are multiply realized in different species. Though at a high level of abstrac-
tion it is clear that both octopuses and human beings have perceptual states, the differences 
among the realizers of these perceptual states account for differences among the kinds of 
perceptual states realized.7 More generally, the fact that different species significantly differ 
with respect to their sensory systems (as well as their output, behavioral, systems) should 
already call to question the functionalist supposition that the same range of psychological 
generalizations will hold across these species.8
Another example presented by Polger and Shapiro with some detail concerns, a fa-
vorite of functionalists, the physical realizers of pain across species. The observation that 
different species of animal exhibit similar avoidance behaviors in response to noxious stim-
uli prompts us, along with Putnam, Block, Fodor and others, to suppose that these differ-
ent species all realize the same mental kind pain. However, for pain to be multiply realized 
by these different species, the similar functional kind must be accompanied by relevant dif-
ferences among its physical realizers. Yet, upon inspection, they argue, we find a great deal 
of relevant physical commonality among different creatures to which we are prone to attrib-
ute pain—physical commonality that accounts for the mental similarity. Focusing on oc-
topuses once more, to the extent that we are willing to attribute to them pain, we find that 
they share similar physical mechanisms to those underlying human pains. Like human be-
ings, octopuses too (like many others in the animal kingdom) have nociceptors, and mech-
anoreceptors in particular, that account for their reactions to mechanical damage. Yet, be-
cause they lack thermal nociceptors, they do not react as human beings do to cold. Thus, 
octopus-pain is different from human pain—the latter but not the former is an outcome of 
extreme cold—but it is also similar. And, crucially, the similarities and differences among 
the realized mental kinds are accounted for by the similarities and differences among their 
physical realizers (thus, once more, violating either condition (1) or (4) of their official rec-
ipe). Contrary to initial appearances, the empirical evidence suggests that pain is not multi-
ply realizable between octopuses and human beings (and many other creatures).9
7 So, if we elect to individuate perceptual states coarsely, taking into account only very coarse-grained 
psychological generalizations, we will find that such psychological generalizations appealing to such 
perceptual-functional kinds do in fact hold of a variety of species. But, then, the differences among 
the physical realizers of those coarse-grained perceptual kinds will merely account for individual dif-
ferences within the same functional kind, and in this way violate condition (4) of Polger and Shapiro’s 
recipe for multiple realization. On the other hand, if we individuate perceptual states finely, taking 
into account very fine-grained psychological generalizations, we will find that such psychological gen-
eralizations do not hold across different species. The physical differences among realizers account for 
their realizing different perceptual-functional kinds, and in this way violate condition (1) of the recipe. 
8 “[E]stablishing multiple realization requires showing that the same psychological state has diverse 
realizations. But we can always disagree with the functional taxonomy, and claim there are psycho-
logical differences at another level of description. So what needs to be established is that the psycho-
logical states are type identical, but it seems it will only be shown that the states have superficial resem-
blances.” (Couch, 2004, p. 203)
9 Another interesting example involving the octopus, which Polger and Shapiro discuss (2016, pp. 113-
114), is memory. Both human beings and octopuses have memory, yet in the case of the former a 
 hippocampus is involved whereas the octopus lacks a hippocampus. On the face of it the kind memory 
appears to be multiply realized. Yet, quoting from Hochner et al. (2006), Polger and Shapiro suggest 
that the same features of the hippocampus that realize memory in human beings are also present in the 
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Finally, Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that reflection on the actual conduct and 
history of cognitive science reveals that such research relies on there being both functional 
and physiological commonalities across species. Without such commonalities, animal mod-
els would be of little use in the study of human cognition. Yet, such models have histori-
cally been, and still are, immensely informative. As just a couple of examples, we can think 
of Mishkin, Ungerleider and Macko’s (1983) research on the two visual systems, which was 
originally conducted on macaques, and Felleman and van Essen’s (1991) identification of 
32 different visual processing areas, once more, in the macaque.10 The significance of this 
research is its applicability to human vision, and such applicability is premised on the inter-
species similarity between the underlying brain structures realizing similar visual processes. 
Such similarities are in fact found. And, the historical success of such research is good rea-
son to take the premise to be warranted.11 Thus, though the physical structures that real-
ize, say, object identification in the macaque brain and the physical structures realizing the 
same perceptual process in human beings differ, it turns out that those differences aren’t 
relevant differences. Object identification is not multiply realized because, as Polger and 
Shapiro would put it, the differences among physical realizers are not differences that con-
tribute to the sameness of the realized function, thus violating condition (3) of their offi-
cial recipe.
Taking these different examples together, we find that Fodor’s claims about the likeli-
hood of inter-species multiple realization lack empirical support. In many cases, what was 
initially thought of as a single, but multiply realized, mental kind turns out upon closer in-
spection to be different mental kinds. In such cases, it turns out that the generalizations of 
psychology do not hold across species, as physical differences among species are accompa-
nied by relevant functional differences that suggest that what was initially considered a sin-
gle mental kind ought to be split into different mental kinds (this is what is often termed 
‘kind-splitting’, discussed at some length by Polger and Shapiro). As we have seen, both oc-
topuses and human beings perceive and feel pain. Yet the physiological differences between 
the two species—differences in the kinds of pigments in their photoreceptors, or differ-
ence in the range of nociceptors they have—realize different kinds of perceptions and dif-
ferent kinds of pains; thus, violating condition (1) of Polger and Shapiro’s official recipe. 
(Alternatively, these same physiological differences merely account for individual differ-
octopus’ MSF-VL system and are responsible for realizing memory in the octopus. Though there are 
anatomical and physiological differences between the two systems, the systems are similar with respect 
to the features that are relevant to each system’s realizing the same mental/cognitive kind, memory. As 
a result, the variability between human beings and octopuses does not give us reason to suppose that 
memory is multiply realized by the two kinds of systems. 
10 The significant point, as they say, is that “…while van Essen’s ultimate interest is in human visual pro-
cessing, this work has been carried out on the macaque. The clear assumption is that the neural or-
ganization in the macaque will provide a defeasible guide to the human brain” (Bechtel and Mundale, 
1999, p. 183).
11 As they say: “One might think, at first glance, that the ability to make comparisons across species ac-
tually depends upon multiple realizability. In fact, it is the very similarity (or more precisely, homol-
ogy) of brain structures which permits us to generalize across certain species. So, in this latter respect, 
in the context of neuroscientific research, they are not multiply realized”(Bechtel and Mundale, 1999, 
pp. 177-178).
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ences within the same coarse-grained mental kind, in which case condition (4) is violated.) 
In other cases, when we have good reason to suppose that similar psychological generaliza-
tions do hold across different species, we find physiological commonalities accounting for 
that fact (thus violating condition (3)). Indeed, comparative neuroanatomical cognitive re-
search requires, and its success in turn supports, the existence of such physiological similari-
ties in functionally similar species.
There are obvious limits to what can be concluded from examples such as these. But, 
at a minimum, we can safely say that the argument for multiple realizability across species 
is far from secure. The best argument for multiple realizability would be actual examples of 
functional kinds that are multiply realized across different species and it is not clear that 
there are any examples satisfying the four criteria that Polger and Shapiro propose. Since 
Fodor rightly emphasized that multiple realizability is an empirical claim, this leaves his ar-
gument for nonreductive physicalism somewhat of a hostage to fortune.
But perhaps there are examples of multiple realizability holding within species, rather 
than across species. This would give examples of what we will term thin multiple realiz-
ability, as opposed to the thick multiple realizability that would be yielded if psychologi-
cal kinds were to turn out to be multiply realizable across species. We will be exploring 
this possibility in the remainder of this paper, considering whether it can be used to reboot 
Fodor’s argument for nonreductive physicalism in the face of the multiple problems that 
there seem to be for the original argument based on thick, cross-species multiple realizabil-
ity.
3.  Using thin multiple realizability to reboot Fodor’s argument against nonreductive 
physicalism
As we observed in the previous section, there is little compelling evidence that any psycho-
logical capacities are multiply realized across species, and what evidence there is projects a 
much more complex picture than Fodor’s argument from multiple realizability for nonre-
ductive physicalism suggests. This section considers a more mundane type of multiple real-
izability, holding within a species rather than across species, and shows how it can be used 
to reboot Fodor’s argument.
We begin by pointing out what we are not talking about. Some proponents of multi-
ple realizability have proposed neural plasticity as a candidate source of multiple realizabil-
ity. In particular, they have pointed to the phenomenon of cortical plasticity, which occurs 
when one cortical area adapts to perform a function or functions normally carried out by 
a different cortical area that has been damaged or is dysfunctional for some other reason.12 
Polger and Shapiro (2016) argue convincingly that even the most plausible candidates 
(such as the interesting example of ferrets “rewired” so that visual information from their 
right visual field is processed by the auditory cortex) fail to satisfy the four criteria in their 
Official Recipe, for reasons similar to those that count against candidates for cross-species 
12 See for example Barrett (2013) and Richardson (2009) for philosophical appeals to cortical plasticity 
as evidence of multiple realizability. 
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multiple realization.13 As with the cross-species examples, the jury is still out, of course, but 
to the extent that cases of neural plasticity are to supply effective support for multiple reali-
zation, they must meet the four criteria identified above, and none that we know of so far 
seem capable of doing so.
The type of thin multiple realizability that we will be discussing is much simpler alto-
gether. To get the flavor of the proposal consider the following passage from Peter Men-
zies, describing experiments carried out by Richard Andersen and colleagues at the Califor-
nia Institute of Technology on how intentions to reach are encoded in the monkey motor 
cortex.
The neural signals that encode the monkey’s intentions to reach for certain targets were re-
corded as averages of the firing rates (spikes per second) of individual neurons. But clearly the 
same aggregate firing rate in a group of neurons is consistent with a lot of variation in the behav-
ior of individual neurons. For example, very different temporal sequences of neural firings can 
give rise to the same firing rate. So an intention to reach for a certain target can be realized in 
many different ways at the level of individual neurons. (Menzies, 2013 p. 62)
According to Menzies, therefore, a given intention to reach a specific target is multiply real-
ized (over time) by different token patterns of neural firings.
Clearly, this way of thinking about multiple realizability is very different from that 
discussed, and criticized, in the previous section, as well as from cortical plasticity. And at 
first glance it seems immune to the general line of objection raised by Polger and Shapiro 
against these more complex candidates for multiple realizability, because it is assumed ex 
hypothesi that there are no significant functional differences across the different neural re-
alizers. Indeed, in the experimental set-up described the truth of the assumption is guaran-
teed, because the monkey is trained to make exactly the same movement across the differ-
ent trials, and what is multiply realized is the intention to make that movement.
In fact, it seems that his type of thin multiple realizability satisfies the four criteria in 
Polger and Shapiro’s Official Recipe. Consider a situation in which a single intention to 
move I7 is multiply realized within the same monkey by two different neural firing pat-
terns, say, NFP26 and NFP47. Here is how each of the criteria are satisfied:
ii(i) NFP26 and NFP47 are both correctly classified as instances of the same intention 
to move, I7.
i(ii) NFP26 and NFP47 are both correctly classified as different neural firing patterns.
(iii) The factors that lead NFP26 and NFP47 to be differently classified qua neural fir-
ing patterns are among those that lead them both to count as instances of the 
same intention to move. This holds because they differ in the respective firing 
profile of their constituent neurons, but it is their firing profiles that secure their 
common causal profile.
(iv) The variation between NFP26 and NFP47 qua neural firing patterns is distinct 
from any variation that there might be between them qua intentions to move. 
This holds trivially because there are no, or only negligible differences between 
them qua intentions to move.
13 See Polger and Shapiro (2016, Ch. 5).
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On the face of it, therefore, there seems to be at least one example of thin multiple realiza-
bility that satisfies Polger and Shapiro’s Official Recipe. And if this example works, then so 
too must countlessly many others.
The question that we will tackle in the remainder of this paper is whether appealing to 
this type of thin multiple realizability can reboot Fodor’s argument from multiple realiz-
ability to nonreductive physicalism, given the lack of substantive evidence for the stronger 
forms of thick multiple realizability that he himself proposed and discussed.
It will be helpful for the following to have a more detailed perspective on what Fodor 
thinks that nonreductive physicalism involves, and how exactly it is supported by multi-
ple realizability. Fodor is working with a standard, Nagelian (1961), account of reduction, 
which requires the existence of ‘bridge laws’ relating predicates of the special science—here, 
psychology—and physical predicates. On this view, where S is some special science, say psy-
chology, and S1x → S2x is a law within S, “[a] necessary and sufficient condition of the re-
duction of (1) [S1x → S2x] to a law of physics is that the formulae (2) and (3) be laws, and 
a necessary and sufficient condition of the reduction of S to physics is that all its laws be so 
reducible.
(2a) S1x ⇔ P1x
(2b) S2x ⇔ P2x
(3) P1x → P2x.
‘P1’ and ‘P2’ are supposed to be predicates of physics, and (3) is supposed to be a physical 
law” (Fodor 1974, p. 98). 
Fodor takes the multiple realizability argument to show that there can be no such 
bridge laws.14 That is, given that a host of different physical systems can satisfy the same 
natural kind predicates of psychology—i.e., the multiple realizability considerations 
above—we can, at best, expect to find ‘bridge laws’ that relate a mental predicate to a wildly 
heterogenous disjunction of physical predicates (of the form Sx ⇔ P1x or P2x or P3x or 
P4x…). He observes: “…this is tantamount to allowing that at least some ‘bridge laws’ may, 
in fact, not turn out to be laws, since … a necessary condition on a universal generalization 
being lawlike is that the predicates which constitute its antecedent and consequent should 
pick out natural kinds.”(1974, p. 108) Yet, the wildly heterogenous disjunction of physical 
predicates to which the candidate ‘bridge’ law refers (i.e., P1x or P2x or P3x or P4x…) does 
not pick a natural kind, because disjunctive predicates are not projectible (Fodor, 1974, 
1997; Kim 1992).
It is straightforward to run a version of this argument using the example of thin mul-
tiple realizability above. Let’s say that it is a law of psychology that an intention to act in a 
14 “What I have been doubting is that there are neurological natural kinds co-extensive with psychologi-
cal natural kinds. What seems increasingly clear is that, even if there is such a co-extension, it cannot 
be lawlike. For, it seems increasingly likely that there are nomologically possible systems other than 
organisms (namely, automata) which satisfy natural kind predicates in psychology, and which satisfy 
no neurological predicates at all. Now, as Putnam has emphasized, if there are any such systems, then 
there are probably vast numbers, since equivalent automata can be made out of practically anything. If 
this observation is correct, then there can be no serious hope that the class of automata whose psychol-
ogy is effectively identical to that of some organism can be described by physical natural kind predi-
cates….” (Fodor, 1974, p. 105)
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certain way will (if the appropriate background conditions are satisfied) lead to the relevant 
action. We can write this as I7 → A. Suppose as before that I7 is multiply realized by neu-
ral firing patterns NFP26 and NFP47 and that we are interested in a potential reduction of 
psychology to neuroscience (which is surely an essential step on any reduction of psychol-
ogy to physics). Then, on the Nagelian model, a successful reduction requires a bona fide 
law of the form I7 ⇔ (NFP26 ∨ NFP47). But there can be no such bona fide law because 
(NFP26 ∨ NFP47) is not a natural kind.
4. Assessing the rebooted argument from thin multiple realizability
We are prepared to grant that the rebooted argument from thin multiple realizability suc-
ceeds in showing that there can be no reduction of intentions to move to neural firing 
patterns—and hence that there are no prospects for reducing psychological laws involv-
ing intentions to move to neuroscientific laws involving neural firing patterns. However, 
we reject the claim that this shows that there can be no reduction of psychology to neuro-
science. The basic problem with this line of argument is that it is mistaken as to the can-
didates it proposes for the neural realizers of intentions to move—and, by extension, for 
where in general it thinks that the neural realizers of psychological events are likely to be 
found. There is no reason that the realizers of psychological events will be highly specific 
neural events, such as actual neural firing patterns. Instead, we propose, there are far more 
plausible candidates for the role of neural realizers. And when we switch attention to more 
plausible candidates, we will see that there actually are good grounds for thinking that there 
exist precisely the type of laws that the rebooted argument claims do not exist.
Here is a preliminary observation. As mentioned in section 1, it is a basic tenet of Fo-
dor’s nonreductive physicalism that mental events be token-identical to their neural real-
izers. However, there is a simple reason for thinking that mental events cannot be token-
identical to actual neural firing patterns. This is because some of the counterfactuals that 
are true of a given mental event fail to hold of the corresponding neural firing pattern.
As before, let I7 be a particular intention to move; let NFP26 be the associated neural 
firing pattern in the monkey motor cortex; and let A be the relevant reaching movement. 
Then we can expect the following two counterfactuals to hold:
(4a) I7 → A
(4b) NFP26 → A
In the language of possible worlds, (4a) says that in all the nearby worlds in which the in-
tention I7 occurs, so too does the action A, while (4b) says the same thing of neural firing 
pattern NFP26. Consider, however, the following two counterfactuals:
(5a) ~I7 → ~A
(5b) ~NFP26 → ~A
On the face of it, (5a) holds, but not (5b). (5a) holds because in all the nearby worlds in 
which the intention to move is absent, the monkey fails to perform action A. In contrast, 
(5b) fails to hold, because the nearby worlds in which neural firing pattern NFP26 does not 
occur are worlds in which some other neural firing pattern with the same causal profile oc-
curs (say, NFP47), bringing about action A. To put it another way, for the monkey to move 
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despite not intending to move, there would have to be some fairly fundamental changes ei-
ther in the antecedent conditions or in the laws of nature—whereas a world in which the 
monkey moves in the absence of neural firing pattern NFP26 would differ from this world 
only in the firing behavior of a relatively small number of neurons.15
That neural firing patterns stand in different counterfactual relations to actions than 
do intentions to move (and mental events more generally) is not news. Some philosophers 
have drawn drastic conclusions from it. E. J. Lowe, for example, has tried to use those dif-
ferent counterfactual relations as an in-principle argument against any version of token-
identity.16 Only slightly less ambitiously, Peter Menzies, independently and in collabora-
tion with Christian List, has used pretty much the very example that we are discussing in 
a series of papers to argue against the causal closure of the physical (Menzies, 2013, 2015; 
List and Menzies, 2009; Menzies and List, 2010). In our view, Lowe, Menzies, and List are 
all over-stating the case.17 At most, all we can conclude is that specific neural firing patterns 
are not the right candidates to serve as the realizers of given mental events. But that should 
simply motivate us to look elsewhere for the appropriate realizers, not to abandon either 
token-identity or the causal closure of the physical.
Still, having said that, we do have a clear constraint upon any such candidate realizer, 
namely, that it should stand in the right kind of counterfactual relations, so that it satisfies 
the equivalents of both (4b) and (5b). To that end, we will argue in the following that the 
most plausible neural realizers for conscious mental events are not specific firing patterns, 
but rather higher-level, or global, properties of populations of neurons that are themselves 
instantiated in (but not necessarily realized by) specific firing patterns. Those higher-level 
properties stand in relations of counterfactual dependence to actions that typically mirror 
those of conscious mental events.
In Bermúdez and Cahen (2018) we proposed a hypothesis about the high-level proper-
ties that realize mental events. That hypothesis drew on important work on the neural cor-
relates of the BOLD (Blood Oxygen Level Dependent) signal, which is the quantity that is 
directly measured in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).18 The basic physio-
logical premise of functional neuroimaging is that cognitive activity increases cellular activ-
ity, which in turn increases blood oxygenation, so that tracking changes in levels of blood 
oxygen as a cognitive task is performed is a good guide to the areas of the brain engaged in 
performing that task. But, neuroscientists have asked, what exactly is the cellular activity 
that brings about increases in blood oxygenation?
The most obvious candidate, proposed by Geraint Rees, Karl Friston, and Christoph 
Koch among others, is that the blood oxygen level in a given neural region increases in pro-
portion to the average firing rate of the neurons in that neural region (Rees, Friston, and 
Koch, 2000). Nikos Logothetis and collaborators came up with a different suggestion, 
15 We are adopting a broadly Lewisian account of similarity across possible worlds, although we do not 
follow Lewis in adopting his strong centering requirement, which would make counterfactuals of the 
form (4a) and (4b) trivially true whenever the antecedent and the consequent are both true at the ac-
tual world. 
16 See, for example, Lowe (2008, pp. 103-107) and Paprzycka (2014) for critical discussion.
17 We have discussed Menzies arguments in Bermúdez and Cahen (2015, 2018). 
18 For a less condensed exposition of the material in this and the following paragraph see section 3.6 of 
Bermúdez (2019). 
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based on justly celebrated experiments that involved recording single cells in the monkey 
primary visual cortex within an fMRI scanner (Logothetis 2001; Logothetis et al, 2001).19 
The experimenters were able to calibrate the strength of the BOLD signal, as measured by 
fMRI, with more fine-grained measures of neural activity measured through single-cell re-
cordings. The results seemed to point to an alternative to the average firing rate hypothe-
sis. This is the local field potential, which is an electrophysiological signal believed to meas-
ure the sum of inputs to the neurons in a given area—as opposed to the neural firing rates, 
which are the outputs from the neurons.
Both the local field potential and average firing rates are examples of global properties of 
neural populations that have been studied by neuroscientists. We suggest that the realizers 
of mental events are such global neural properties (GNP), as opposed to specific neural firing 
rates.20 There is no need for the moment to identity a specific type of GNP as a candidate re-
alizer. All we want to propose is that we should be looking for the realizers of mental events 
at the level of GNPs, rather than at the level of specific neural firing patterns. The important 
point is that GNPs stand in a many-one relation to specific neural firing patterns.21
Suppose, then, that the neural realizers for mental events are GNPs, as we have sug-
gested, and consider the overarching aim of functional neuroimaging. One of the basic 
goals of functional neuroimaging is to identify meaningful correlations between the perfor-
mance of different cognitive tasks, on the one hand, and the BOLD signal, on the other.22 
Moreover, the basic aim of experimental design in imaging studies is to screen out correla-
tions that are not law-like. Hence the emphasis on replicability and consistency across stud-
ies. Of course, the enterprise is still at a relatively early stage of development, and there are 
all sorts of methodological issues to tackle.23 But still, we claim, the project of functional 
neuroimaging makes scientific sense to the extent that it looks for law-like correlations be-
tween different types of cognitive function (as manifested in experimental tasks) and cellu-
lar activity in the brain, as measured in the BOLD signal.
If this way of thinking about the enterprise of functional neuroimaging is correct, then 
we can expect a completed neuroscience to contain laws connecting different types of cog-
nitive activity to global properties of neural populations. Let’s hypothesize that neurosci-
ence has moved on a long way, so that functional neuroimagers are able to identify not just 
changes in the BOLD signal, but also the underlying global neural properties. This is all 
that we would need to derive the required conclusions about counterfactual dependence.
19 These experiments were very complex from an engineering point of view, because the standard (metal) 
tools for single-cell recording cannot be used in the magnetic field of a scanner.
20 In the remainder of this section we will speak in terms of mental events being realized by properties. 
Strictly speaking, the neural realizers are events with the relevant participating properties. 
21 It may be more appropriate to think of the relation as instantiation, rather than realization. For one 
reason, as we will shortly see, the counterfactual dependence between GNPs and actions maps onto 
that between intentions and actions, which is not true of specific neural firing patterns. See Bermúdez 
and Cahen (2018, n. 16).
22 Of course, this is not the only goal. Functional neuroimagers are also greatly concerned, for example, to 
plot patterns of functional and effective connectivity within the brain. But arguably it is the existence 
of meaningful correlations between mental activity and the BOLD signal that underwrites, and gives 
point to, the search for connectivity. 
23 For more details see Bermúdez (2019) Ch. 9, as well as sections 3.5, 3.6, and 17.1. 
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Let’s assume, to stick with our example, that the motor intention I7 is operationalized 
through a particular task. That task might, in fact, be performing action A. After repeated, 
well-designed experiments in the scanner, a team of neuroscientists proposes as a law that 
some particular GNP, say GNP123, reliably causes action A (when the background condi-
tions are appropriately configured). GNP123 might be a given average firing rate for some 
neurons in the motor cortex, or it might be a specific value for the local field potential for 
that population of neurons—or some as yet unknown global neural property. Then, given 
that laws support counterfactuals and that performing action A is the experimental opera-
tionalization of motor intention I7, it will follow that the following two pairs of counter-
factuals both hold:
(6a) I7 → A
(6b) GNP123 → A
and
(7a) ~I7 → ~A
(7b) ~GNP123 → ~A
These are exactly the counterfactuals required for GNP123 to count as a realizer of I7.
However, and here is the rub, the very reasons that make GNP123 a plausible candi-
date for the neural realizer of motor intention I7 count towards reductive physicalism, not 
a Fodorean non-reductive physicalism.24 This is because all the considerations that we have 
been reviewing point towards the existence of precisely the kind of bridge laws that yield a 
standard, Nagelian reduction. If there is a lawlike correlation between GNP123 and action 
A, and performing action A is the experimental operationalization of motor intention I7, 
then there seem to be no good reasons to deny the existence of a bridge law linking I7 and 
GNP123. But once we have those bridge laws, then we are well on the way to reductive phys-
icalism.
5. Conclusion
For Fodor, the route to non-reductive physicalism relies on the multiple realizability of 
mental kinds. It is multiple realizability that guarantees that no genuine bridge laws re-
lating mental kinds to physical kinds can be established, so that the former cannot be re-
duced to the latter. However, as Fodor claims, and Polger and Shapiro (2016) emphasize, 
the multiple realizability of the mental is an empirical hypothesis. As such, its plausibility 
depends on what evidence we might have for the actual multiple realization of the mental. 
Yet, when considering the actual evidence, things don’t look good for non-reductive physi-
calism.
Genuine cases of cross-species (or, thick) multiple realizability, which were the focus 
of Fodor’s original arguments, are hard to come by. Closer inspection of initially appealing 
24 In his (2012), Shapiro provides different motivations for thinking that the realizers of mental events 
may be higher-order (or, ‘aggregate’) neural properties, which would call into question the thesis of dis-
tinctness at the heart of non-reductive physicalism.
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examples, such as the presence of pains or a capacity for memory in octopuses, reveals their 
appeal to be illusory.
Nonetheless, Fodor could still support non-reductive physicalism if he could establish 
the empirical plausibility of thin, intra-species, multiple realizability of mental kinds. In-
deed, many have thought that mental kinds are multiply realized by different neural firing 
patterns in different individuals within a species and even in different time slices of a single 
individual. However, we have argued that upon closer inspection neural firing patterns are 
not plausible candidate realizers of mental kinds. Instead, we argued that the neural realiz-
ers of mental kinds are more plausibly higher-level, global, properties of neural assemblies. 
Yet, crucially, because such properties stand in the same relevant counterfactual depend-
ence relations as do the mental kinds they realize, we have good reason to think that these 
mental kinds are reducible to those higher-level properties.
In sum, contra Fodor, empirical considerations lead us to deny the (inter-species and 
intra-species) multiple realizability of mental kinds, to deny non-reductive physicalism and 
the autonomy of psychology, and to affirm, instead, the possible reducibility of psychology 
to neuroscience.25
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